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Abstract
This paper focuses on the evolution of child labour, fertility and human
capital in an economy characterized by two type of individuals, low and high
skilled workers. This heterogeneity allows for an endogenous analysis of in-
equality generated by child labour. More specifically, according to empirical
evidence, we offer an explanation for the emergence of a vicious cycle between
child labour and inequality. The basic intuition behind this result is the inter-
dependence between child labour and fertility choices: unskilled parents tend
to have a high number of children and to send them to work whereas skilled
parents tend to have a low fertility rate and a high investment in education.
The fertility differential between high and low skilled increases the fraction
of unskilled workers in the labour market which in turns reduces unskilled
wage. The fact that children can offers only unskilled labor reinforces such
process creating a vicious cycle between child labour and inequality.
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1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction
This paper presents a model where the interaction between child labour,
fertility and human capital offers an explanation for a vicious cycle between
child labour and inequality. The basic intuition behind this result is the
interdependence between child labour and fertility choices: unskilled parents
tend to have a high number of children and send them to work whereas
skilled parents have a low fertility rate with a high investment in education.
The fertility differential between high and low skilled increases the fraction
of unskilled workers in the labour market which in turns reduces unskilled
wages. The fact that children can offers only unskilled labor reinforces such
process creating a vicious cycle between child labour and inequality.
As shown in Figure 1, we find empirical evidence of a positive relation-
ship between inequality and child labour. In this figure, we use the data
on children not attending school (i.e.number of out-of-school children as a
percentage of all primary school-age children) as a proxy of child labour
given the shortage of data on child labour. Even if this measure presents
the shortcoming that a child not attending school is not necessarily work-
ing, on the other hand it is more easier to monitor children not attending
school with respect to children that are working. In addition, the rate of
children out of school should give also a measure of children working within
the household or engaged in unofficial which are not included in the number
of children economically active (see Cigno and Rosati, 2002). Note also that
while still positive, the relationship between child labour and inequality has
begun to flatten in recent years. A possible explanation of this result could
be the increasing attention by national and international organizations to
child labour.
Our work is related to a large body of the literature which has devel-
oped theoretical and empirical models to study the causes of child labour
persistence (see for example Basu and Van, 1998; Basu, 1999, 2000; Baland
and Robinson, 2000; Dessy, 2000; Dessy and Pallage, 2001, 2005; Ranjan,
1999, 2001). The benchmark framework is based on two main axioms: the
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Figure 1: Children out of school and Gini Index (1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-
2000). Nonparametric kernel smoother. Per capita GDP data are from
Penn World Table 7.0. Gini Index data are from World Income Inequality
Database. Children out of school data are from World Development Indica-
tors (2010)
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luxury axiom and the substitution axiom (Basu and Van, 1998 and Basu,
1999). The luxury axiom implies that parents send children to work if their
income is below a certain threshold. The substitution axiom implies that
adult labour and child labour are substitutes. These axioms lead to multiple
equilibria in the labour market, with one equilibrium where adult wage is
low and children work and another where adult wage is high and children do
not work.
This framework has been extended by Dessy (2000), Hazan and Berdugo
(2002) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) which introduce endogenous fertility
choices. They analyze the relationship between child labour, fertility and
human capital showing the existence of multiple development path. In early
stages of development, the economy is in a development trap where child
labour is abundant, fertility is high and output per capita is low. Techno-
logical progress, allows a take-off from the underdevelopment trap because it
gradually increases the wage differential between parental and child labour
and hence the return of investment in education.
However these contributions do not consider the presence of inequality,
i.e. the economy can follow different paths of growth that are characterized
– in equilibrium – by a unique level of human capital. We extend this frame-
work taking into account two groups of individuals with two different levels
of human capital. In this respect our work is related to the literature on
inequality, differential fertility, and economic growth. In particular, Moav
(2005) develops a theory of fertility that offers an explanation for the persis-
tence of poverty within and across countries. The basic idea is that the cost
of child quantity increases with parent’s human capital since the opportu-
nity cost of time is high. High-income families choose low fertility rates and
high investment in education. This implies that high income persist in the
dynasty. On the other hand, poor households choose relatively high fertility
rates with relatively low investment in their offspring’s education. Therefore,
their offspring are poor as well. De la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) argue
that a higher inequality, by increasing fertility differential between rich and
1 Introduction 4
poor families, lowers average education and, therefore, growth. The motiva-
tion for this result is that a large fertility differential implies more weight on
children with little education. From a similar perspective, Galor and Zang
(1997) show that due to financial market imperfections countries with smaller
average family size and with more equal distribution of income attain a high
economic growth. Morand (1999) develops a model in which fertility deci-
sions are motivated by old-age support. He shows that a rich economy with
an equal distribution of income evolves on a growth path with increasing
levels of human capital. By contrast, a poor economy can take off on the
growth path only if there exists a class of relatively high skilled agents.
The interaction between fertility differentials and inequality is also the
focus of Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Kremer and Chen (2002). Dahan and
Tsiddon (1998) show that fertility and income distribution follow an inverted
U-shaped dynamics during the transition to the steady state. In the first
stage of development the high fertility among poor leads to a higher propor-
tion of poor and thus to a greater inequality. When income inequality reaches
a certain threshold, wage differential is high enough to lead some poor agents
to invest in human capital. Thus the number of skilled agents rises, fertility
declines and income becomes more equally distributed. Kremer and Chen
(2002) develop a model that generates multiple steady states of inequality,
when the initial proportion of skilled workers is high the economy converges
to a steady state with low inequality, on the other hand when the initial
proportion of skilled workers is too low the economy converges to a steady
state with high inequality.
In this paper we show that, by incorporating child labour in this frame-
work, a persistent vicious cycle between inequality and child labour can per-
sist for generations. In particular we develop an overlapping generation model
with two types of workers - low and high skilled. According to the existent
literature, we assume that child labour is a perfect substitute for unskilled
adult but children are relatively less productive. Adults allocate their time
endowment between work and child raring. They choose the number of chil-
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dren and their time allocation between schooling and work. Hence, house-
holds can have two, possible, sources of income: income by parents and child
income. Human capital of children is an increasing, strictly concave function
of the time devoted to school which in turns depends on parent’s income (see
Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; De la Croix and Doepke,
2004; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002). As a result the model shows an inter-
generational persistence in education levels. This effect with the differential
fertility between low and high skilled parents produces a continuous increase
in the inequality and child labour and an average impoverishment within the
country. According to the model of Doepke (2004), our paper suggests that
child labour regulation is essential in reducing permanently inequality.
Section 2 describes the model and the optimal individual choices. In
Section 3, we investigate the properties of the short run general equilibrium.
Section 4 analyses the long run dynamics of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze an overlapping-generation economy which is populated by Nt
individuals. Each of them is endowed with a level of human capital, hit.
This level is endogenously determined by parent’s choice on the children’s
time allocation between labour and schooling. Adults can supply skilled or
unskilled labour, while children can only supply unskilled labour.
2.1 Production
For the sake of the argument we assume that labour is the only production
factor. Production occurs according to a neoclassical, constant return to
scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using unskilled and skilled labour
as inputs. The output produced at time t, Yt, is
Yt = ψ(Ht)
µ(Lt)
1−µ = ψ(st)µLt; 0 < µ < 1, (1)
where st ≡ Ht/Lt is the ratio of skilled Ht to unskilled labor Lt employed
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in production in period t, and ψ > 0 is the technological level. Producers in
period t choose the level of unskilled labour , Lt, and the efficiency units of
labour, Ht, so as to maximize profits. Thus the wage of unskilled workers,
i.e. wut , and the wage rate per efficiency unit w
s
t are
wut = ψ(1− µ) (st)µ , (2)
and
wst = ψµ (st)
µ−1 . (3)
2.2 Preferences
Members of generation t live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. In
the childhood, individuals may either work, go to school or both. In the
adulthood, agents supply unskilled or skilled labour. Individual’s prefer-
ences are defined over consumption , i.e. cit, the number of children n
i
t, and
the human capital of children hit+1.
1 The utility function of an agent i of
generation t is given by
U it = α ln c
i
t + (1− α) ln(nithit+1), (4)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the altruism factor.
We suppose that children born with some basic human capital a, which
can be increased by attending school. In particular, human capital of children
in period t+ 1 is an increasing, strictly concave function of the time devoted
to school
hit+1 = a(b+ e
i
t)
β, (5)
where a, b > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
1As it is clear from equation (4), we assume that parents are aware of the human
capital of their children rather than their income. Although the results of the model are
not crucially affected by this choice, we believe that this is a more realistic assumption,
see for instance De la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Galor (2005) for discussion on this
point.
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Parents allocate their income between consumption and child rearing. In
particular, raising each born child takes a fraction z ∈ (0, 1) of an adult’s in-
come. In addition, parents allocates the time endowment of children between
schooling, eit ∈ [0, 1], and labour force participation (1− eit) ∈ [0, 1]. We as-
sume that, each child can offer only θ ∈ [0, z) units of unskilled labour, that is
children are substitutes for unskilled adult workers but relatively less produc-
tive.2 Therefore, each household can have two, possible, sources of income:
i) parent income, I it = max{wsthit, wut } and, ii) child income, (1− eit)θwut . In-
deed, while children can work only as unskilled workers, parents will choose
to work in the sector that guarantees them the highest income. Hence, the
budget constraint is
cit ≤ (1− znit)I it + (1− eit)θwut nit. (6)
2.3 Individual choices
Each household chooses cit, n
i
t and e
i
t so as to maximize the utility function
(4) subject to the budget constraint (6). Given the wage ratio, the opti-
mal consumption, the optimal schooling and the optimal number of children
chosen by member i of generation t are
ct = αI
i
t ; (7)
eit =

0 if rit ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
ritβz−θ(β+b)
θ(1−β) if
θ(β+b)
βz
≤ rit ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1 if rit ≥ θ(1+b)βz ;
(8)
and
2The assumption z > θ means that the ratio between the income of child labour when
the child just works and the cost of rising a child – i.e. the relative return of child rearing
(θ/z) – is less than 1. This further implies that it is not possible to increase income by
simply “producing” more children.
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nit =

(1−α)rit
zrit−θ if r
i
t ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
(1−α)(1−β)rit
zrit−θ(1+b) if
θ(β+b)
βz
≤ rit ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1−α
z
if rit ≥ θ(1+b)βz ;
(9)
where rit ≡ I it/wut . In particular,
rit =
 1 if w
s
th
i
t ≤ wut ,
wsth
i
t
wut
if wsth
i
t > w
u
t .
(10)
Since hit = a(b + e
i
t−1)
β, the ratio rit is a function of the level of education
chose in period t− 1.
Agent i, according to her level of human capital hit, chooses to work as
unskilled if, and only if, wsth
i
t < w
u
t , while she works as skilled if, and only
if, wsth
i
t > w
u
t . Finally, if w
s
th
i
t = w
u
t agent i is indifferent to work as skilled
or unskilled. Note that, from equation (10), if parents find convenient to
work as unskilled, their choices on fertility and education do not depend on
income since rit = 1 – see equations (8) and (9).
3
3 General Equilibrium
This last result highlights the emergence of a marked asymmetry between
agents who offer skilled and unskilled work. For the sake of the argument,
we assume that in the initial period, t = 0, population is divided in two
groups which are endowed with two different levels of human capital a low
level of human capital hu0 and a high level h
s
0, with h
u
0 < h
s
0. We show that
such a difference may persist across generations. At any period t, if hut < h
s
t ,
low skilled workers choose to work as unskilled if and only if wsth
u
t < w
u
t ,
while if wsth
u
t > w
u
t they would prefer to work as skilled.
4 Since we assume
perfect mobility of labour at equilibrium the ratio wut /w
s
t must satisfy w
s
th
u
t ≤
3According to the existent literature the model shows a trade-off between quantity
and quality of children. See, for istance, Hazan and Berdugo (2002) for an analysis with
constant wages.
4The superscript u and s refers to low and high skilled workers respectively.
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wut ; otherwise all the labour force would offer skilled labour, which it is
not possible given equation (2). A similar argument applies to high skilled
workers; thus wsth
s
t ≥ wut . Therefore, for any hut ≤ hst , at equilibrium
hut ≤
wut
wst
≤ hst . (11)
From equations (10) and (11), it holds
rut = 1, (12)
and
1 ≤ rst ≤
hst
hut
, (13)
for all t ∈ N0.
Equation (11) clarifies that this model presents three different regimes,
which influence the equilibrium outcome and, more precisely, determine dif-
ferent supplies of labour for low and high skilled workers. Two regimes are
corner solutions. If at equilibrium wsth
s
t = w
u
t , high skilled workers are indif-
ferent to work as skilled or unskilled. On the other hand, if at equilibrium
wsth
u
t = w
u
t , a fraction of low skilled workers work as skilled. In the other
case, when hut <
wut
wst
< hst , low skilled only work as unskilled and high skilled
only as skilled.
It is worth to point out that if in a certain period t, market equilibrium
implies wsth
s
t = w
u
t , in period t+1 there will be no difference between low and
high skilled workers, since all the population gets the same adult income and
makes the same schooling and fertility decisions. This argument does not
apply when wsth
u
t = w
u
t , since in that case high skilled workers get a higher
income equal to wsth
s
t that is greater than w
u
t if h
s
t > h
u
t .
3.1 Internal equilibrium
Let us assume that in period t, 1 < rst <
hst
hut
. As we pointed out above, under
such condition low skilled workers find convenient to work as unskilled and
high skilled as skilled. Thus, at equilibrium – if it exists – the economy is
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characterized by two classes of income (wsth
s
t > w
u
t ), which make different
fertility and schooling decisions – see equations (8) (9).
The existence of two income classes implies that the aggregate demand
is:
Dt = c
u
tN
u
t + c
s
tN
s
t , (14)
where Nut and N
s
t are, respectively, the number of low and high skilled agents.
Moreover, from equations (2), (3) and (7), cut = αψ(1 − µ)sµt and cst =
αhstψµs
µ−1
t .
At time t, since all the low skilled adults choose to work as unskilled, the
supply of unskilled labour, Lt is given by the labour supplied by low skilled
adults, i.e. (1− znut )Nut , plus the labour supplied by the children of low and
high skilled parents, i.e. (1− eut )nutNut and (1− est)nstN st . At equilibrium this
supply must be equal to the total demand of unskilled labour. Thus,
Lt = (1− znut )Nut + θ[(1− eut )nutNut + (1− est)nstN st ]. (15)
The supply of skilled labour, must be equal to the demand of skilled
labour, that is
Ht = (1− znst)hstN st . (16)
From equations (1) and (14), the equilibrium in the goods market yields
Lt = α
(1− µ)stNu + µhsN s
st
. (17)
The ratio between equations (16) and (17) defines the equilibrium level of st
s∗t =
hst
1− µ
[
1− znst
α
− µ
]
1
xt
, (18)
where xt ≡ Nut /N st . Note that s∗t depends only on the choice of nst . The
other variables N st , N
u
t and h
s
t are given at period t because they depend on
choices made in period t− 1. In order to understand the relation between s∗t
and nst it is convenient to rewrite r
s
t . From equations (2), (3) and (18), we
obtain,
3.1 Internal equilibrium 11
rst =
wsth
s
t
wut
=
µαxt
1− znst − µα
. (19)
Therefore we can have different values of s∗t and r
s
t according to the values
of fertility of skilled workers at time t.
From equation (9), the fertility choice of high skilled workers is given by
nst =

(1−α)rst
zrst−θ if r
s
t ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
(1−α)(1−β)rst
zrst−θ(1+b) if
θ(β+b)
βz
≤ rst ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1−α
z
if rst ≥ θ(1+b)βz .
(20)
Thus the function nst takes different values according to the value of r
s
t .
By solving the system given by equations (19) and (20) we get the equilibrium
level of rst and n
s
t . We obtain
rst
∗ =

2θαµxt
θ(1−αµ)+zαµxt−
√
∆1(xt)
if xt ≤ x2
2θ(1+b)αµxt
θ(1+b)(1−αµ)+zαµxt−
√
∆2(xt)
if x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
µxt
1−µ if x3 ≤ xt
(21)
where ∆1(xt) = [zαµxt−θ(1−αµ)]2 +4θ(1−α)zαµxt and ∆2(xt) = [zαµxt−
θ(1 + b)(1− αµ)]2 + 4θ(1− β)(1− α)zαµxt; x2 = θ(b+β)[bα(1−µ)−β(1−α)]zαµβb , x3 =
θ(1−µ)(1+b)
µβz
.
Note that the equilibrium value of rst
∗ depends only on the ratio between
the number of low and high skilled workers. Moreover, in an internal equi-
librium it must hold that 1 < rst
∗ < h
s
t
hut
. Thus it is possible that for some
values of xt does not exist an internal solution. Figure 2 clarifies this result.
The function rst
∗ is a piecewise function defined in the interval x ≤ xt ≤ x¯
– that implies 1 < rst
∗ < h
s
t
hut
– where an internal equilibrium always exists.
In the case presented in Figure 2, as long as xt increases r
s
t
∗ becomes equal
to
hst
hut
before reaching the level θ(1+b)
βz
, that is the level which ensures est = 1.
Depending on the values of parameters many different cases are possible, but
such an analysis does not give mach insight. In the Appendix we shows that
the derivative of rst
∗ with respect of xt is always positive.
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1
hst
hut
rst
∗
θ(β+b)
βz
θ(1+b)
βz
xtx x¯x2 x3
Figure 2: A numerical illustration of rst
∗ as a function of xt. An internal equilibrium
exists if and only if x ≤ xt ≤ x¯. Value of parameters: α = 0.9; µ = 0.3; z := 0.3; θ = 0.25;
β = 0.4; b = 0.2; a = 1.
Given rst
∗, it is easy to obtain the equilibrium values for all the other
variables of the model. Note, that for xt ≤ x2 high (and low) skilled workers
do not invest in education, for x2 < xt < x3 high skilled workers send children
to work and to school, est ∈ (0, 1), while for x3 ≤ xt they send children only
to school (est = 1).
3.2 Corner solutions
The previous analysis clarifies that the equilibrium of the system depends on
the level of xt, that is the ratio between low and high skilled in the economy.
If this ratio is smaller than x, the number of high skilled is too high, given
the technology available, and therefore the wage of the high skilled is equal to
the wage of the unskilled (wsth
s
t = w
u
t ). This implies that for any 0 ≤ xt ≤ x,
rut = r
s
t
∗ = 1 (see Figure 2).
On the other hand, if xt > x¯, high skilled workers are too small with
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respect to low skilled. Thus the wage for unit of human capital (wst ) is
high enough to allow low skilled to work as skilled getting the same wage of
unskilled labour (wsth
u
t = w
u
t ). This implies that for any x¯ ≤ xt, rst ∗ = h
s
t
hut
(see Figure 2).
4 Long Run
Fertility choices of the two groups affect the relative size of high and low
skilled labour. This relation is crucial in determining the wage ratio, and
hence the dynamics of human capital.
Since Nut+1 = n
u
tN
u
t and N
s
t+1 = n
s
tN
s
t , the population dynamics is given
by
Nt+1 = n
u
tN
u
t + n
s
tN
s
t . (22)
At the same time it is possible to determine the dynamics of xt ≡ Nut /N st .
Indeed we have that
xt+1 =
nut
nst
∗xt. (23)
The fertility of low skilled workers nut ≥ nst ∗, where
nut =

(1−α)
z−θ if 1 ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
(1−α)(1−β)
z−θ(1+b) if
θ(β+b)
βz
≤ 1 ≤ θ(1+b)
βz
,
1−α
z
if 1 ≥ θ(1+b)
βz
,
(24)
and in any internal equilibrium, from equations (20) and (26)
nst
∗ =

θ(1−αµ)−zαµxt+
√
∆1(xt)
2θz
xt ≤ x2
θ(1+b)(1−αµ)−zαµxt+
√
∆2(xt)
2θz
x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
(1−α)
z
xt ≥ x3
(25)
We define a long run equilibrium a trajectory in which individual choices
do not change from one period to the next. Since choices at any period t are
affected by income, in a long run equilibrium wage ratio must be constant
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which means that there must be a constant proportion of skilled and unskilled
labour. However, as long as there is inequality in the economy (the income
of high skilled is higher than the income of low skilled), the fertility choices
between the two groups are different: the ratio xt changes over time.
There are three limit cases, where inequality disappears after the first
period.
First, if, 1 ≥ θ(1+b)
βz
, low skilled workers send their children only to school.
The fertility choices of high and low skilled workers are the same and all the
population will be characterized by the maximum level of human capital.
Second, if, 1 ≤ θ(β+b)
βz
and in period t = 0, x0 ≤ x2, high skilled workers
send their children to work. Thus next generation will be characterized by
the minimum level of human capital: the differences between the two classes
disappear.
Third, if in period t = 0, x0 ≤ x thus high skilled workers get a level of
wage equal to wu0 . Also in this case, their choice of fertility and education
are equal to the choice of low skilled workers.
Beside those limit cases, the economy is characterized by an increase in
inequality in the transition. Indeed given that at any period the equilibrium
only depends on xt, we can easily characterized the possible trajectories
taking into account Figure 2.
For any max{x, x2} < xt < x¯, the fertility of high skilled workers is per-
manently lower than the fertility of low skilled workers. Thus from equation
(23) xt rises over time. This process leads to a continuous increase in r
s
t
∗
which in turn leads to an increase in the human capital of children of skilled
parents, i.e. hst+1. Thus the presence of differential fertility leads on the one
hand to an increases wst and a reduction of w
u
t and on the other hand to
a high hst+1. This process generates a continuous increase in the inequality
and an increase in child labour, since generation by generation the number
of high-skilled workers decreases and become richer whereas the number of
low skilled workers increases and become poorer.
The increase in hst leads also to an increase in x¯, which may allow the
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dynamics of human capital to reach its maximum level. However, the con-
tinuos increase in xt implies that at a certain period, t = t˜, xt˜ = x¯. In that
situation low skilled workers are indifferent to work as skilled or as unskilled.
A share of low skilled will work as skilled in order to maintain the equality
wsth
u
t = w
u
t . Thus for any t > t˜ the wage ratio is constant. The economy
is in a long run equilibrium where wages do not change, but the presence
of differential fertility induces an increase of low skilled workers which send
their children to work (at least partially). Thus the high-skilled fraction
of population tend to zero, while an higher fraction of low skilled workers
tend to work as skilled. In other words, the economy in the long run will
be populated only by low skilled workers which continue to send children to
work.
5 Final Remarks
This paper is built on the idea that the persistence of child labour is strictly
linked to the presence of inequality within the country. For this reason we
present a model where the population is divided in two groups endowed with
two different level of human capital. We study how this initial heterogeneity
affect the distribution of income in the long run. The crucial result of this
analysis is that the increase in the return of human capital is not sufficient
to induce a transition to a high-skilled economy. The presence of two groups,
with different levels of initial human capital, generates a continuous increase
in the income of the high skilled workers with respect to those endowed with
a low level of human capital. The presence of endogenous fertility induces
low income group to make an higher number of children. Thus, child labour
will increase. The substitutability between adult and child labour increases
the resilience of this result: the economy is trapped in an equilibrium with a
high fraction of the population with low income and low human capital. In
other words, we find a vicious cycles between child labour and inequality.
This framework can be easily extended to evaluate the issues currently
discussed in the literature. For instance, further research is needed to ana-
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lyze the role of technical progress and international labour standards. With
respect to the first issue, preliminary results seem to reject the hypothesis
that technical progress can, by itself, induce the low-skilled group to invest
in children’s education. Another interesting application of the model is to
evaluate public policies that through taxation on high-skilled individual may
subsidies the low-skilled labour inducing them to invest in education. This
policy may generate together a reduction of inequality and the disappearance
of child labour.
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A Appendix
In this section we show that rst is always an increasing function of xt. In order
to simplify the notation we denote: A = 2θαµ, B = θ(1 − αµ), C = zαµ,
D = 4θ(1 − α)zαµ. Given this simplification we can rewrite equation 26 as
follows
rst
∗ =

Axt
B+Cxt−
√
(Cxt−B)2+Dxt
if x1 ≤ xt ≤ x2
A(1+b)xt
B(1+b)+Cxt−
√
[Cxt−B(1+b)]2+D(1−β)xt
if x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
µxt
1−µ if x3 ≤ xt ≤ x4
(26)
Thus the derivative of the first line is positive if
2B
√
(Cxt −B)2 +Dxt > 2B(Cxt −B)−Dxt, (27)
where squaring both sides we get that it always holds
α(1− µ) > 0 (28)
The derivative of the second line is very similar. It is positve if
2B(1+b)
√
(Cxt −B(1 + b))2 +D(1− β)xt > 2B(1+b)(Cxt−B(1+b))−D(1−β)xt.
(29)
Squaring both sides we get that it always holds
b(1− αµ) + α(1− µ) + β(1− α) > 0 (30)
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